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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTRY CLUB FOODS,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case
No. 9192

vs.
GALE V. BARNEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Seventh
Judicial District Court arising out of an action on a motor
vehicle collision that occurred on February 23, 1956 in the
city of Price, Utah, and in which a vehicle owned and operated
by the defendant-appellant was involved with a vehicle owned
by plaintiff-respondent and driven by its employee. The trial
judge, the Honorable F. W. Keller, sitting without a jury,
3
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found the issues in favor of plaintiff and against defendant
and gave judgment in harmony with his findings for the
amount stipulated to by counsel for the respective parties. It
is from the findings and judgment that this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 23rd day of February, 1956, at approximately
8:40 o'clock A.M., Lavoy B. Gale, an employee of plaintiff,
Country Club Foods, while in the course of his employment,
was driving his employer's 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half
ton truck at a speed of approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour
in a southerly direction along Sixth East Street in Price, Utah.
At that time, defendant, Gale V. Barney, was driving his
1948 Dodge one-half ton pick-up truck at a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour in an easterly direction along Third
South Street in the same city. Sixth East Street and Third
South Street were gravel roads about 18 feet in width with
12 feet additional width for shoulders and formed an open
intersection which did not have traffic controls of any kind.
When Mr. Gale reached a point in the vicinity of onequarter of a block from the intersection he looked to his right
and observed the vehicle being driven by defendant about
one-half block from the intersection and approaching it at an
unknown rate of speed. After observing the vehicle approaching
from his right plaintiff's employee driver did not thereafter
look to his right again until he had entered the intersection
and reached the center thereof. It was not until that time that
he became aware of the proximity of defendant's pick-up truck
or the imminence of the collision. Mr. Gale attempted to
4
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avoid the accident by swerving to the left but a collision occurred between the two vehicles. The front end of defendant's
pick-up truck collided with plaintiff's truck near its right rear
wheel.
The northwest corner of the intersection, which was the
common corner of the intersection between the two vehicles,
was, at the time of the accident, a flat vacant field enclosed
by a barbed wire fence. Both drivers could readily see across
the open field and observe each other and any other vehicles or
pedestrians approaching the intersection for a dist4nce of one
block from the right or left as the case might be.
At the trial of this case, after the conclusion of the evidence by both parties and argument by counsel, the trial judge
indicated that, "it may be that there is some negligence on the
part of plaintiff," but that such negligence was not a proximate
or contributing cause of this collision. He also asserted that
he was satisfied that if defendant had been looking the accident
never would have occurred (R. 27).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEE DRIVER WAS' GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED
TO THE COLLISION AND PLAINTIFF'S RESULTING
DAMAGE, .AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS IMPUTED TO PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD HAVE BARRED
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY.
5
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POINT II
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT
ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEE DRIVER,
IF FOUND FROM THE RECORD, MUST NECESSARILY
HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING, PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT AND ITS RESULTING DAMAGE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEE DRIVER WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXI~IATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED
TO THE COLLISION AND PLAINTIFF'S RESULTING
DAMAGE, AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS IMPUTED TO PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD HAVE BARRED
PLAINTIFF'S -RECOVERY.

It is undisputed that since plaintiff's employee driver was
acting in the course of his employment when the collision and
its resulting damage occurred, his negligence, if any, is imputed
to plaintiff, Country Club Foods.
Defendant's contention expressed in Point I is based upon
the testimony elicited from Lavoy B. Gale, plaintiff's employee,
on direct examination and upon cross examination during the
trial. Mr. Gale's testimony is that while driving his employer's
truck in the course of his employment at a speed of between
20 and 2 5 miles per hour in a southerly direction along Sixth
East Street in Price, Utah, he approached the intersection of
Sixth East Street and Third South Street. This is an open
intersection (R. 5, 19). When he got to a point which he
6·
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estimated to be about one-quarter of a block from the intersection he looked across the open field which formed . the
common corner of the intersection between the two vehicles
and observed defendant's truck approaching the intersection
from Third South Street. Mr. Gale estimated defendant's
vehicle to be about one-half block from the intersection but
he did not know nor could he estimate the speed at which
it was traveling (R. 15, 17). After apprising himself of the
fact that another vehicle was approaching the intersectioh and
that it was traveling at an unknown rate of speed and possessing the directional right-of-way, plaintiff's employee drove
one-quarter of a block and entered the intersection without
again looking to his right, thus disregarding any other ve~icular ,"
traffic approaching the intersection or any pedestrian traffic,
adult or ipfant, which may have been approaching the intersection from the iright (R. 15, 17, 18, 19). That Mr. Gale's
vision was not obscured in relation to defendant's vehicle or
any other vehicle, object or person that was approaching the
intersection from the right is amply shown by testimony received at the trial (R. 10, 18, 24).
The Utah cases are legion to the effect that one approaching or entering an intersection whether or not he is t.Q,e. favored
driver has a duty to use due care in proceeding into and across·
the intersection. It is true that a motorist does not have the
burden to drive so carefully that he will always be prepared
for and to be able to avoid negligence of another, but he does
have the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use reasonable
care to avoid a collision and he is not permitted to close. his
eyes to other vehicles which he knows or ought to know, or
has reason to believe are approaching simply because a statute
7
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or municipal ordinance designates him the favored driver.
Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 190 P. 2d 514 (1948).
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In that case the Court declared that the fact that a motorist
has looked once and. has concluded that he has time to clear
the intersection does. not relieve him of negligence in not
having looked again where he is uninformed as to the speed of
the approaching automobile and where the speed at which the
motorist is travelling, combined with the distance he has to
travel before entering the path of the approaching vehicle
permits him time to look again and reappraise the relative
positions of the automobiles and permits an opportunity to
correct the first conclusion if it is erroneous. Hickok v. Skinner,
op. cit.
The recent case of Johnson v. Syme, Admx., 6 Utah 2d
319, 313 P. 2d 468 (1957), dea.ls with an automobile accident
at a cont~olled intersection on an arterial highway. In this
case plaintiff was driving north on U.S. Highway 91 approaching the Draper Road. She collided with a car driven by defendant's decedent who drove onto the highway from a road
approaching from the right (the Draper Road). The driver
whose administratrix was defendant in the case was killed.
The car he was driving did not stop or slow down for the stop
sign which was designed to control westbound traffic on the
Draper Road. Plaintiff, who was familiar with the intersection
and the highway, admitted that she did not see decedent's car
until it was directly in front of her. However, witnesses whc
were following plaintiff about a block behind had no difficulty
in observing and watching the whole occurrance including
8
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decedent's car's approach toward the highway from a considerable distance along the Draper Road, through the stop
sign, into the intersection and onto the collision and fatality.
In its opinion, 6 Utah 2d 319, the Court said:
"Under such circumstances we cannot but conclude
that plaintiff either looked and failed to see the obvious,
or failed to look at all, and, as a matter of law negligent!y contributed to her own in juries and the death
of another motorist.
"In other instances of negligent failure to look or to
see that which is there to be seen, where the facts were
no stronger than those here, we have concluded, as we
do here, that there was contributory negligence as a
matter of law which precluded recovery."
Cases cited to support this decision are Sant v. Miller,
115 Utah 559, 206 P. 2d 719; Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah
45, 169 P. 2d 777; Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.
2d 495; Cox v. Thompson, Utah 254 P. 2d 1047; Wilkinson
v. Oregon Short R. R. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466; Covington
v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P. 2d 788.
It is worthy of note at this point that Johnson v. Syme,

op. ct., deals with an arterial through highway intersection
protected by a stop sign. This made plaitniff' s position in that
case much stronger than plaintiff's position in the case now·
before the Court; and if Mrs. Johnson was found contributorily negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout, which
negligence was held to be a contributing and proximate cause
of the collision and resulting injury, a fortiori plaintiff's employee in the case now on appeal was guilty of contributory
negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision and
resulting damage in this particular fact situation;
9
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Other Utah cases dealing with .this point are:
Gren v. Norton, Utah 213 P. 2d 356 ( 1949), where the
Court said that the fact that a statute gives a motorist a right
of way into an intersection does not permit him to proceed
across without observing the movement of other vehicles which
rna y ·be moving into and across the intersection.
In Conklin v. Walsh, 113 U. 276, 193 P. 2d 437 (1948),
the Court held that the duty to keep a proper lookout applies
as well to the favored driver on an arterial highway as to the
disfavored driver on an intersecting street, and neither can
excuse his own failure to observe because the other driver
failed his duty.
Bullock v. Luke, 98 U. 501, 98 P. 2d 350 (1940), involved a vehicle collision at an open intersection where the
driver on the right did not see the driver on the left, although
the latter was visible for 800 feet, until he' was 15 or 20 feet
from the intersection. In disposing of the matter the Court
held that the rights of the possessor of the right-of-way under
such a statute are only relative, and one is not relieved of the
duty of using due care simply because he is the apparent possessor of the right-of-way. At 98 P.2d 350, 352 the Court
declared:
"No driver is at any time excusable for want of
vigilance or failure to observe what may plainly be
seen."
Although plaintiff had the right-of-way on approaching
an intersection in Martin v. Stevens, 121 U. 484, 243 P. 2d
747, 751 (1952), the Court indicated in that case that there
devolved upon plaintiff the duty of due care in observing
other traffic.
10
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In Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106 U. 289,
147 P. 2d 875, 880, ( 1944), it was declared that:
"Actual possession of the right-of-way, as opposed
to a physical position of two vehicles with reference to
the intersection which under the statute confer it, (the
right-of-way) presupposes that motorists entering the
intersection have exercised due care, including that of
keeping a proper lookout."
Text authority supporting defendant's position is as follows:
"A motorist intending to cross a street in front of
another car should so watch and time the movement
of the other car as to reasonably insure safe passage,
either in front or rear thereof, stopping and waiting
if necessary.''
2 Blashfi.eld, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice,
Pern. Ed., Sees. 1023, 1038, op. 271, 230.
Appellant therefore contends, on the basis of the record
and the authorities on this point, that as a matter of law, the
trial court was bound to find plaintiff's employee driver guilty
of negligence that was a contributing and proximate cause of
the collision, that such negligence was imputable to plaintiff,
that s.uch negligence precluded recovery on the part of plaintiff
against defendant, and that the trial court erred in not so
finding and giving judgment accordingly.

POINT II
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT
ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEE DRIVER,
11
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IF FOUND FROM THE RECORD, MUST J\TECESSARILY
HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING, PROXIMATE· CAUSE
OF THE ACCIDENT AND ITS RESULTING DAMAGE.
Proximate cause is defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
Fourth Edition, p. 1391, as:
.. "An act or omission immediately causing. or failing
to prevent injury; an act or omission occurring or concurring with another, which, had it not happened,
injury would not have been inflicted."
The word "proximate" means "near," and any particular
conduct, to be a proximate cause of injury, must be effective
as a cause at the time the injury is inflicted, and in one of three ·
ways: It must immediately precede and lead into the injury,
or, if the conduct began or was done at a prior time, either
it or a condition created by it must continue to the time of
injury. Alexander v. Hammarberg, 108 Cal. App. 2d 872, 230
P. 2d 399; Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 203, 239
P. 2d 2d 48; Shivers v. Von Lobensels, 109 Cal. App. 2d 286,
240 P. 2d 635; Dodge v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 92 Cal.
App. 2d 759, 208 P. 2d 37; Kittman v. Levine, 115 Cal. App.
2d 844, 253 P. 2d 102.
So far as the lookout kept by plaintiff's employee driver,
Mr. Gale, is concerned, the record reveals that he looked to
his right when about one-quarter of a block from the intersection. He saw defendant's vehicle approaching the intersection at an unknown speed and he did not thereafter look
again until he had entered the intersection and this, despite
the fact that his view to the west on Third South Street was
unobscured for a distance of the whole block within which

12
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limits defendant's truck and any other vehicle or pedestrian
traffic was visible at all times.
The trial judge asserted that he was confident that if
defendant had been looking the accident never would have
occurred. By the same token, by his utter failure to look until
a time when the accident had become unavoidable, plaintiff's
employee driver, Gale, deprived himself of the opportunity
to do anything which might have avoided the collision. He
kept no lookout ,such as would be effective for avoidance of
the accident.
The Court's attention is respectfully directed to
authorities cited and discussed in the argument to Point
this brief. In those cases the negligence was held to be
tributory negligence proximately causing the collision
damage there involved.

the
I in
conand

It is, therefore, the contention of defendant that plaintiff's
employee driver's failure to keep a proper lookout when preparing to and entering an open intersection and his failure
to keep the vehicle he was operating under control was negligence on his part that contributed to and was the proximate
cause of the collision and such negligence should have been
found as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
The evidence from the record is clear that plaintiff's employee driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law and that such negligence was a contributing and proximate cause of the collision and the damage resulting there-
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from. It is also equally clear that the negligence of plaintiff's
employee driver is imputed to the plaintiff.
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant should be set aside and a judgment of no cause of action entered against the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
D. Gary Christian
Attorneys for Defendant

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

